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What is diacritical hermeneutics? First a brief 
word on what I mean by hermeneutics gener-
ally, then several words on the qualifier, dia-
critical.1 
        
     I understand hermeneutics as an art of de-
ciphering multiple meaning. In its most basic 
sense this relates to the human capacity to 
have ‘two thinks at a time,’ as James Joyce 
said. More precisely, it refers to the practice 
of discerning indirect, tacit or allusive mean-
ings, of sensing another sense beyond or be-
neath apparent sense. This special human ac-
tivity may in turn call for a method of second-
order, reflective interpretation involving a 
process of disclosing concealed messages, 
either by a) unmasking covered-up meaning 
(hermeneutics of suspicion) or b) by disclos-
ing surplus meaning (hermeneutics of affir-
mation). In short, I understand hermeneutics 
as the task of interpreting (hermeneuein) plu-
ral meaning in response to the polysemy of 
language and life.2 
        
     Hermeneutics, thus viewed, is an activity 
carried out in the name of its founding spirit, 
Hermes: Messenger of gods, guardian of 
thresholds, and carrier of cryptic codes. The 
three original disciplines of hermeneutics, 
formulated by Friedrich Schleiermacher in the 
19th century, were theology, law, and philol-
ogy. Why these? Because each solicited an 
interpretation of dual meanings: a) divine and 
human (theology), b) prosecutorial and defen-
sive (law), c) ancient and actual (philology). 
All three disciplines called for a method of 
discriminating between different and often 
conflicting readings. Wilhelm Dilthey would 
add ‘history’ to the list as a universal human 
science devoted to reading between past and 
present; a science, which he saw as a model 
for a general hermeneutics of life as it inter-
prets itself. Whence the birth of philosophical 
hermeneutics. 
           
     Later, Heidegger would broaden the defi-
nition further in speaking of an ontological 
hermeneutic committed to understanding the 
fundamental difference between Being and 
beings - a task based on a pre-understanding 
of our everyday existence as being-toward-
death. The famous hermeneutic circle. Finally, 
and more recently, thinkers like Gadamer, 
Ricoeur, and Caputo have augmented the con-
temporary project of philosophical hermeneu-
tics in various significant ways (semantic, 
psychoanalytic, deconstructive). But what all 
these different hermeneutic movements share 
is a commitment to the task of adjudicating 
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between different levels of meaning. 
 
     So where exactly does diacritical herme-
neutics fit in? And how might it contribute to 
the hermeneutic legacy described above? 
          
     I have already sketched my project of dia-
critical hermeneutics in the Introduction to 
Strangers Gods and Monsters and other relat-
ed texts.3 But as John Caputo has remarked, 
this project has, to date, been more performed 
than explained. I will attempt to redress the 
balance here by addressing the question under 
five main headings: 
     
     1) In the most obvious sense, dia-critical 
involves a critical function of interrogation. I 
mean this in the modern sense of the term 
from Kant’s three Critiques down to the more 
contemporary movements of Critical Theory 
from Horkheimer and Adorno to Habermas 
and Foucault. In this broad sweep, I would 
obviously include critiques of race, class, 
gender, power, and the unconscious: All criti-
cal philosophies, which carry on the legacy, 
amongst others, of the ‘three masters of sus-
picion’ (Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche). In short, 
I understand critique here as both a) an in-
quiry into the conditions of possibility of 
meaning; and b) a critical exposure of 
‘masked’ power in the name of liberation and 
justice. This latter more ethico-political aspect 
of critique is one I find lacking in most main-
stream hermeneutic methods to date (Dilthey, 
Heidegger, Gadamer) until we arrive at Ric-
oeur’s hermeneutics of suspicion and 
Vattimo’s hermeneutics of subversion. 
 
     2) Second, dia-critical involves the criteri-
ological function of discerning between com-
peting claims to meaning. This comprises 
hermeneutic retrievals of previous testimonies 
as well as future oriented projects - utopian, 
messianic, eschatological. ‘Emancipation is 
itself a tradition,’ as Ricoeur says; it is a form 
of ‘anticipatory memory.’ The idea of eman-
cipation does not erupt ex nihilo. It does not 
start with modern revolutions and the En-
lightenment; rather it draws from a whole pal-
impsest of prior narratives of liberation going 
back, in the West, to Biblical stories of exo-
dus and the Socratic awakening. Aristotle ad-
dresses the question of ethical criteria already 
when he remarks that if you wish to com-
municate the meaning of a virtue you recount 
the story of someone who embodies it - e.g., 
Achilles for courage, Penelope for constancy, 
Tiresius for wisdom. Such narratives - ancient 
or modern - provide phronesis with exempla-
ry paradigms by which to measure, judge, and 
act. Otherwise how could one tell the differ-
ence between just and unjust actions? These 
differences require careful criteriological dis-
criminations. And there are obviously other 
essential criteria apart from the narrative one 
mentioned (e.g., rational deliberation of rights, 
virtue ethics, pragmatist judgment, phenome-
nological intuition of values, spiritual exercis-
es, feminist and socio-cultural critiques, wis-
dom traditions etc.). In short, pace decon-
struction, I am not against criteria as long as 
they involve vigilant discernments and dis-
tinctions. 
 
     3) Third, in keeping with the more precise 
dictionary definition of dia-critical, I refer to a 
grammatological attention to inflections of 
linguistic marks. In this technical sense, dia-
critics provides rules for differentiating be-
tween minute units of language (signifiers, 
graphemes, accents). Think, for example, of 
the difference, which the following accents - 
grave, acute, circumflex, and diaeresis - make 
on the same letter in the French language: é è 
ê, ë. Or think of how ‘où’ with an accent 
(meaning ‘where’) differs from ‘ou’ without 
accent (meaning ‘or’). These silent, discreet 
signs distinguish between values of the same 
character. Small graphic demarcations thus 
serve to avoid confusion between otherwise 
identical letters, helping us differentiate be-
tween distinct meanings. More generally, in 
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structural and post-structural linguistics, dia-
critics denotes a way of reading differentially, 
across gaps and oppositions, in keeping with 
the Saussurian maxim that language is a net-
work of ‘differences without positive terms’. 
In these respects, diacritics is all about micro-
reading. And here, I think, I share common 
ground with John Caputo’s radical hermeneu-
tics and Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction.4 
  
     4) In addition to this technical usage in 
linguistic and semiotic practice, diacritics also 
has the older diagnostic meaning of reading 
the body. The Greek terms, dia-krinein and 
dia-krisis, referred to the medical or therapeu-
tic practice of diagnosing symptoms of bodily 
fevers, colorations, and secretions. In this 
sense, the word designated the hermeneutic 
art of discriminating between health and dis-
ease. Such a skill to read between the lines of 
skin and flesh - in order to sound the move-
ments of the soul (homeopathic or allopathic) 
- was often a matter of life and death. Need-
less to say, this model of micrological reading 
of somatic and psychosomatic symptoms has 
deep implications for the practice of philo-
sophical reading in its own right. I agree with 
Wittgenstein that philosophy is therapy. In 
sum, diacritical hermeneutics should do you 
good! 
 
     5) These four characteristics – critical, cri-
teriological, grammatological and diagnostic - 
comprise the basis of what I call, finally and 
most primally, ‘carnal hermeneutics.’ Here 
we are concerned with a hermeneutics that 
goes all the way down. It covers diacritical 
readings of different kinds of Others - human, 
animal or divine. All with skins on. Such car-
nal hermeneutics has a crucial bearing, to take 
just one example, on how we ‘sense’ subtle 
distinctions between hostile and hospitable 
strangers (the same term, hostis can refer to 
guest or enemy). And pursuing this example I 
would say that diacritical hermeneutics has 
two patron saints - the god Hermes and the 
dog Argos.5 For if Hermes discloses hermetic 
messages from above, Argos brings animal 
savvy from below. The former guides our de-
ciphering of cryptic masks and messages 
(Hermes appears to Baucis disguised as a 
beggar). The latter, Argos, imparts a canine 
flair for recognizing the friend or enemy in 
the visitor (e.g., Odysseus returned to Ithaca 
to oust the suitors).6 
 
     Diacritical hermeneutics may thus be de-
fined as both sacred and terrestrial in so far as 
it ranges up and down - in ascending and de-
scending spirals - from the highest hintings of 
the absolute to the lowest soundings of the 
abyss. While hands reach up, feet reach down. 
But no matter how high or low hermeneutic 
‘sense’ goes, it never leaves us totally in the 
dark. It is not blind but half-seeing and half-
believing. It is a sort of incarnate phronesis, 
which probes, scents, and filters. Something 
akin to Wittgenstein’s seeing-as in our most 
ordinary perceptions or Heidegger’s under-
standing-as in our most basic moods (see his 
analysis of Verstehen-Befindlichkeit in Being 
and Time). This fundamental form of existen-
tial sensibility is further radicalized in Mer-
leau-Ponty’s more embodied notion of ‘dia-
critical perception’ to which I shall return be-
low.7 
 
     At this stage, and by way of addressing 
some of the more recent discussions of her-
meneutics, we might ask how our fivefold 
model of diacritical hermeneutics compares 
with John Caputo’s method of ‘radical her-
meneutics’ inspired by Derrida’s deconstruc-
tion. While the diacritical and radical ap-
proaches share a common commitment to mi-
cro-logical reading, there are significant dif-
ferences. In contrast to deconstructive sans-
savoir, diacritical hermeneutics practices a 
certain savoir, which goes beyond Derrida’s 
maxim of ‘reading in the dark.’ Diacritical 
savoir should, I suggest, be understood in its 
original etymological sense of tasting: Sa-
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vourer, sapere, sapientia. It is not knowledge, 
in the purely cognitive or theoretical attitude 
(here I agree with deconstruction); but it is 
some kind of savvy nonetheless. Sense as 
primal interpretation, reading between the 
lines of skin and flesh. A sensing, which 
makes sense in the three connotations of the 
French sens: Sensation, direction, meaning. I 
am concerned here, in short, with a multi-
layered sensing which goes all the way up and 
down - like Jacob’s ladder - from thought to 
touch and back again.8 Meaning ascending 




By way of elaborating further on the different 
inflections between diacritical hermeneutics 
and deconstruction let me explore for a mo-
ment the implications of what I call ‘diacriti-
cal sensation.’ I refer here, most simply, to 
familiar phrases like ‘I don’t know how to 
read you?’ or ‘your face betrays your feelings’ 
or the proverbial ‘the eyes are the mirrors of 
the soul.’ Lady MacBeth puts it well to her 
husband, ‘your face is like a book, my Thane, 
where men may read strange matters.’ Mostly 
such phrases are used in relation to facial ex-
pressions - glancing or shading of eyes, wid-
ening of pupils, raising of eyebrows, altering 
of complexion, stiffening or loosening of lips, 
smiling or grimacing of mouth. But facial vi-
sion, as bearer of inner moods, deep feelings 
and moral emotions, is not the only medium 
of expression. In addition to our ability to see 
(or see through) we also have the ability to 
hear, touch, smell and taste. Each sense has its 
own special savoir/saveur and is deeply struc-
tured in terms of body mapping, orientation 
and negotiation. Sensing is never neutral. 
Every sense possesses its particular symbol-
ique, as Levi-Strauss demonstrated in his 
structural anthropology of la pensée sauvage. 
Even the most basic culture of food is a way 
of carving up our universe into edible and in-
edible, raw and cooked, herbivorous and car-
nivorous, hostile and hospitable. Matters of 
taste are often matters of inclusion and exclu-
sion, even of life or death. And taste here is as 
literal as it is figural (since it subverts the dis-
tinction); or, more accurately, it is not just a 
matter of aesthetic indifference, as Kant held, 
but of actual savoring upon the lips, tongue 
and palette. Man is what he eats, as the old 
adage goes; but he is also how he eats. The 
contents of the menu are less important than 
how one chooses this dish or that, or mixes 
flavors and savors, or why one sits down to 
the meal in the first place. Chaqu’un à son 
goût. 
 
     Taste is, perhaps, the primordial sense of 
carnal hermeneutics. The most alimentary is 
the most elementary. For tasting is already, ab 
initio, a transfiguring of nature into culture. It 
involves a splitting of the world into binaries 
which may remain opposed or symbolically 
combine.9 A dialectic of sundering and salva-
tion through food is to be found in most wis-
dom traditions. Adam and Eve taste the apple. 
Abraham and Sarah dine with sacred 
strangers. Krishna swallows the puff of rice 
giving fullness back to emptiness. Jesus 
breaks bread in Emmaus restoring his broken 
body. Isis’s fish consumes the dismembered 
flesh of Osiris. Each great wisdom tradition is, 
it seems, marked by such moments of inaugu-
ral eating.   
    
     Let me say a few words about just one of 
these foundational scenes before returning to 
a more phenomenological account of diacriti-
cal sensation. 
                                                    
* 
 
One of the oldest records of sacred eating, in 
the western Indo-European tradition, is to be 
found in the Taittiriya Upanishad. Here we 
read how the divine manifests itself in the of-
fering and eating of food.10 ‘Treat your guests 
like gods’ (1.11.2) when giving food, we are 
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told, for ‘that (food) is Brahman.’ (3.1) The 
true self of mind and vital breath was consid-
ered to dwell within food, considered as an 
interconnection between the cosmic elements 
of air and earth. (3.9) The task of the host is to 
discern this culinary ‘correspondence’ and 
thereby recognize the god within the guest.  
Offering hospitality to the guest is a sacred 
act in that it reminds us of the integrity of 
body and soul illustrated by the equation: 
food-true happiness-Brahman. The Upanishad 
concludes with a resounding paean to the 
transfiguring power of food. The self becomes 
sacred in a sacramental identification with 
eating: ‘I am food! I eat him who eats the 
food! I have conquered the whole universe! I 
am like the light in the firmament.’ (3.10.6) 
This ancient belief found classic expression in 
the formula: ‘Anna (food) - the first manifes-
tation of Brahman’; and it later became the 
basis for a long Vedantic tradition of hospital-
ity where saintly figures offer themselves as 
food and reveal themselves in the act of eat-
ing and being eaten. The unexpected guest (a-
thiti) who asks to be fed is a god waiting to 
become manifest. In feeding the guest we 
greet the divine and taste its food. A primal 
act of carnal hermeneutics. 
 
     We find clear affinities here with similar 
acts of sacred hospitality in Biblical literature.  
Recall again Abraham and Sarah feeding the 
three divine strangers at Mamre (Gen); or 
Christ offering his body as Eucharistic bread 
at the Last Supper and at Emmaus; or return-
ing as the stranger (hospes) who asks and re-
ceives food from passersby. (Matt 25) I have 
treated such inaugural scenes of sacred trans-
formation between hosts and guests elsewhere, 
so I will not dwell further on them now.11 
Suffice it to note that the sacred sharing of 
food is not confined to Hindu or Biblical tra-
ditions but is also to be found in Buddhist, 
Greek and other cultural myths of Gods ap-
pearing as guests at the table of hospitality. 
On studying such recurring motifs one might 
be tempted to infer the existence of some 
trans-cultural, or quasi-universal, practice of 
gustatory hospitality. And one might be right. 
But such comparative theologies of the 
tongue themselves involve a work of diacriti-
cal hermeneutics - a second-order methodical 
interpretation of first-order interpretations of 
carnal communication between hosts and 
guests.12 All such primal scenes of eating, 
across diverse religions and cultures, bear 
witness to common practices of tasting the 
divine in the human and the human in the di-
vine. They offer us choice ingredients for a 
gourmet guide to the gods. Delicate dégusta-
tions of hidden things. 
 
     It might be noted, finally, that if gustatory 
hospitality is one inaugural practice of civili-
zations, sexual hospitality is another. Note, 
for example, how in Biblical scripture Sarah 
and Mary both experience ‘miraculous con-
ceptions’ (Sarah is barren, Mary a virgin) 
when they receive strangers into their hearts-
wombs (chora), while many heroines of Hel-
lenic, Celtic and Eastern mythologies have 
carnal congress with guests-become-gods. In 
such founding narratives, touch, smell, sight 
and sound are often synaesthesized with taste 
in the meetings of gods and mortals. From the 
beginning divinity becomes flesh in multiple 
ways. The polysemy of such primal enflesh-
ment is, I submit, a key task of diacritical 




We do not, however, have to look to the an-
cient narratives to find evidence for the dia-
critical connoisseurship of the senses. We al-
ready find examples of such carnal hermeneu-
tics in our everyday sensations. Here we 
might take special heed of the pioneering 
phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, and in 
particular his notion of ‘diacritical perception.’ 
This idea was first developed in his Collège 
de France Lecture courses, La Conscience et 
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l’acquisition du language (1950) and Le 
Monde sensible et le monde de l’expression 
(1953, henceforth MSME). Borrowing liber-
ally from Saussure's notion that words only 
signify by virtue of their differences with oth-
er words, Merleau-Ponty argues that mean-
ings are never given as isolated terms or ob-
jects but always as parts of a mobile interac-
tion of signs involving intervals, absences, 
folds and gaps (écarts). This is not just a 
function of language, however, but the very 
structure of perception itself. Insofar as per-
ception is thus structured like language in its 
nascent state it is diacritical. Here is how 
Merleau-Ponty puts it in an important Note 
from his 1953 lectures: 
 
Diacritical notion of the perceptual sign. 
This is the idea that we can perceive differ-
ences without terms, gaps with regard to a 
level (of meaning) which is not itself an 
object - the only way to give perception a 
consciousness worthy of itself and which 
does not alter the perceived into an ob-ject, 
into the signification of an isolating or re-
flexive attitude. (MSME, p. 203-204) 
  
     In a subsequent note entitled ‘Diacritical 
perception’ - no longer merely a ‘notion’ but 
now a sensible quality of perception itself - 
Merleau-Ponty adds this intriguing example. 
To see another’s visage is to interpret it car-
nally ‘as’ this or that form of expression: 
 
To perceive a physiognomy, an expression, 
is always to deploy diacritical signs, in the 
same manner as one realizes an expressive 
gesticulation with one's body. Here each 
(perceptual) sign has the unique virtue of 
differentiating from others, and these dif-
ferences which appear for the onlooker or 
are used by the speaking subject are not de-
fined by the terms between which they oc-
cur, but rather define these in the first place. 
(MSME, p. 211) 
 
This logic of diacritical perception is alien to 
the classical approach of difference presup-
posing identity. On the contrary, writes Mer-
leau-Ponty, the identity of terms emerges in 
the tension of their differences, their contours 
arising from the encroachment (empiètement) 
of things on things. And here he coins the 
term ‘infra-thing’ in contradistinction to the 
old notion of discrete objective substances. 
 
     Here Merleau-Ponty departs from the Aris-
totelian habit of defining something new in 
terms of a preexisting genre or foundation. 
Diacritical perception through gaps reveals 
the inadequate character of the traditional 
one-to-one correlation between consciousness 
and object; such derived correspondence aris-
es only in retrospect and ignores the fact that 
there never was an object in the first place but 
only several different infra-things, and at the 
very minimum a reversible interplay between 
figure and ground (fond). This plurality of 
infra-things is irreducible to the dualist 
framework of an isolated mind faced with an 
isolated object. Diacritical perception is, Mer-
leau-Ponty insists, the sensing of meaning as 
it expresses itself in the intervals between 
such infra-things of our experience. It in-
volves our sense of identity through differen-
tiation rather than differentiation through 
identity.13 
 
     Our most basic carnal sensations may thus 
be said to be structured diacritically in so far 
as they are structured like the phonetic differ-
entiations of language. “To have a body capa-
ble of expressive articulation or action and to 
have a phonetic system capable of construct-
ing signs, is the same thing” (MSME, p. 204). 
Our body schemas, Merleau-Ponty claims, 
operate like phonetic systems which function 
according to principles of which they are not 
conscious (e.g., parole is not conscious of 
langue). But to compare carnal perception to 
linguistic structure in this way is not to reduce 
the latter to the former (naturalism), nor to 
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reduce the former to the latter (structuralism). 
Nature does not make the body any more than 
it makes phonetic systems. And it would be a 
mistake to construe the perceptual capacity to 
play with principles of which it is not imme-
diately aware as some kind of ‘unconscious.’ 
Perception of figure is not simultaneously 
perception of ground - but rather ‘impercep-
tion’: the sensing of the invisible in and 
through the visible, a ‘sentir en profondeur,’ 
by negations, absences, gaps (écarts). Or as 
Merleau-Ponty puts it in Gestalt language: 
“consciousness of the figure is consciousness 
without knowledge of the ground (fond)” 
(MSME, p. 204). 
 
     We may say therefore that diacritical per-
ception witnesses the birth of expression, 
against an unformed background, as a mean-
ing which begins and re-begins, an awakening 
which takes the form of a figure that is pre-
figured and refigured again and again, now 
fore, now aft, now here, now there.14 Hence 
the importance of Merleau-Ponty’s metaphor 
of modulation: “Consider sensation itself, the 
act of sensing (le sentir), as the intervening of 
a figure on a fond. Modulation. As a sound 
modulates silence. As a color modulates an 
open space by varying it. Every sign is dia-
critical” (MSME, p. 206). And Merleau-Ponty 
adds significantly, “This is Valéry’s idea,” 
thereby indicating that his use of the term ‘di-
acritical’ is as indebted to literary poetics as it 
is to structural linguistics. Either way, this 
birth of meaning occurs not in the manner of a 
foundational cause (as in the old metaphysics) 
but as a diacritical play of visible and invisi-
ble, an embodied vigilance capable of signal-
ing and resuscitating full being (l’être total) 
on the basis of a fragment (MSME, p. 204-
205). This diacritical interplay between figure 
et fond represents an endless reversibility - for 
what is one perceiver’s figure is another's 
fond and vice versa. The diacritical art of per-
ception, enacted in the advent of sensing, ul-
timately amounts, in Merleau-Ponty’s view, 
to the displacement of natural cause by cul-
tural expression. 
 
     In the 1953 lecture notes, Merleau-Ponty 
offers one further telling illustration of the 
diacritical isomorphism of perception and 
language. He compares the perception of 
movement to the comprehension of a sentence. 
We only understand the beginning of a sen-
tence from its end, he says, just as we only 
perceive movement in light of its goal. Per-
ception does not follow something as it dis-
places itself from one fixed place to another, 
as if one solid object succeeded another; it 
proceeds rather as a wave which stretches 
back and forth across distances in the same 
manner as a sentence circulates through a 
whole linguistic field. Carnal sensation is a 
fold (pli) in the moving flesh of the world; 
there is no world without it and it cannot be 
without a world. “Like signs in language,” 
writes Merleau-Ponty, “the points traversed in 
movement have only a diacritical value; they 
do not function in themselves as places but 
rather as passages in the same way as words 
of a sentence are traces of an intention which 
(invisibly) transpierces them” (MSME, p. 
205). Or to put it another way, perception op-
erates like language in that it does not con-
front an ob-ject head on, but senses things 
which speak to it laterally, on the side, pro-
voking one’s ‘complicity’ in the manner of an 
‘obsession.’ Less objective than obsessional, 
then, the thing perceived ‘solicits’ us (Valéry). 
Like an epiphany that calls for remembrance 
(Proust); or a poetic word which invites co-
naissance (Claudel); or a pregnancy that 
yearns for birth and rebirth (Bachelard); or a 
frosted branch whose every crystal signals a 
whole order of emergent meanings (Stendhal). 
With all these literary analogies, Merleau-
Ponty is suggesting that each perception of 
the world constructs itself on the basis of an 
emerging part which solicits our co-creation 
of this world; just as language constructs itself 
in terms of a circular movement between a 
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present part and absent whole. (Merleau-
Ponty also uses here the analogy of a film 
montage where each frame functions in the 
movements between gaps across an invisible 
background). 
 
     But it is important to remind ourselves 
here that the diacritical model of carnal inter-
pretation is not a matter of voluntarist inven-
tion (à la Sartre). It is not a question of read-
ing into something but of reading from (à par-
tir) something. We are solicited by the flesh 
of the world before we read ourselves back 
into it. Carnal attention is as much reception 
as creation. We are far from idealism. And 
this is why I think Merleau-Ponty insists that 
the solicitation of our body schema functions 
symbolically, laterally, indirectly, like a sexu-
al or ontological surprise. Diacritical sensa-
tion, across distances and intervals, comes not 
just from us but from another person or thing 
that meets us ‘like a stranger in the dark.’ 
Merleau-Ponty again cites Paul Valéry to 
make his point. “A man is nothing so long as 
nothing draws from him effects and produc-
tions which surprise him” (MSME, p. 205). 
But to be surprised one must be ready to re-
ceive, open to solicitation and seduction, pre-
pared to partake of the thing sensed and sym-
bolized. Every sense, as Merleau-Ponty con-
cludes, has its own symbolique. Every carnal 
act and organ inscribes its own imaginaire. 
From sexual expression to the act of eating 
itself. Nature is already culture as soon as we 
sense it as this or that. Sensation is expression 
and expression sensation. Flesh is word and 
word flesh. Hence the significance of Mer-
leau-Ponty’s description of perception in 
terms of a diacritical Eucharistic communion: 
 
Just as the sacrament not only symbolizes, 
in sensible species, an operation of Grace, 
but is also the real presence of God, which 
it causes to occupy a fragment of space 
and communicates to those who eat of the 
consecrated bread, provided that they are 
inwardly prepared, in the same way the 
sensible has not only a motor and vital 
significance, but is nothing other than a 
certain way of being in the world suggest-
ed to us from some point in space, and 
seized and acted upon by our body, pro-
vided that it is capable of doing so, so that 
sensation is literally a form of commun-
ion.15 
 
     What we have here is a basic analogy of 
proper proportionality: A is to B what C is to 
D. Namely, the sacrament of transubstantia-
tion is to the responsive communicant what 
the sensible is to the capable perceiver. Mer-
leau-Ponty goes on to delineate this quasi-
eucharistic power of the sensible as follows: 
 
I am brought into relation with an external 
being, whether it be in order to open my-
self to it or to shut myself off from it. If 
the qualities radiate around them a certain 
mode of existence, if they have the power 
to cast a spell and what we called just now 
a sacramental value, this is because the 
sentient subject does not posit them as ob-
jects, but enters into a sympathetic rela-
tion with them, makes them his own and 
finds in them his momentary law.16 
      
     In other words, each sensory encounter 
with the strangeness of the world is an invita-
tion to a ‘natal pact’ where, through what we 
might call ‘diacritical sympathy,’ the human 
self and the strange world give birth to one 
another. Sacramental sensation is a reversible 
rapport between myself and others, wherein 
the sensible gives birth to itself through me. 
 
     A fine example of carnal hermeneutics. 
Everyday perception as exquisite empathy. 
 
              
* 
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Let me add, finally, that because diacritical 
hermeneutics is carnal - in the first and last 
instance - it fulfills itself as applied.17 To say 
that understanding is incarnate is to say that it 
answers to the life of suffering and action. Its 
application to human embodiment is its origi-
nal and ultimate end. And here we return to 
its diagnostic role as a caring for lived exist-
ence - a listening to the pulse of suffering and 
solicitation between one human being and 
another. And, at times, between human being 
and that which precedes and exceeds it. It is 
in the passages ‘between’ that the dia of dia-
critical takes on its full meaning. Diagnosis 
calls for endless dialogue: between disciplines, 
between text and action, between word and 
flesh, and above all between human persons 






1This essay is a development of a talk deliv-
ered to the Canadian Hermeneutics Institute at 
the University of Calgary in June 2011. 
 
2 This outline of a general philosophical her-
meneutics is particularly indebted to Paul 
Ricoeur, in the wake of the prior formulations 
of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Martin 
Heidegger. See also note 8 on Ricoeur below.  
3 For my previous descriptions of diacritical 
hermeneutics see the Introduction to my 
Strangers, Gods and Monsters (London: 
Routledge, 2003); interview in my Debates in 
Contemporary Philosophy (New York: Ford-
ham University Press, 2007, p. 249- 250); ‘A 
Dialogue in Diacritical Hermeneutics’ in Le 
Souci du Passage, essays in honour of Jean 
Greisch (edited by Philippe Capelle, Edition 
du Cerf, Paris, 2004); ‘Entre soi-meme et un 
autre: l'herméneutique diacritique de Ricoeur’ 
in Ricoeur: Cahier de l'Herne (edited by 
Francois Azouvi and Myriam Revault d'Al-
lonnes , L'Herne, Paris, 2004); ‘Eros, Diacrit-
ical hermeneutics and God’ in Philosophy 
Today, vol. 55 special SPEP issue (edited by 
Cynthia Willett and Leonard Lawlor, 2011); 
and ‘Diacritical Hermeneutics’ in Maria Luisa 
Portocarrero, Luis Umbelino, and Andrzej 
Wiercinski, ed., Hermeneutic Rationality/La 
rationalité herméneutique (Münster: LIT Ver-
lag, 2011), p. 177-196. I find my thinking on 
diacritical hermeneutics resonates, at times, 
with the recent work of Jean Greisch, Merold 
Westphal, Peter Kemp and David Tracy.  
4 I am particularly indebted to John Caputo 
and Jacques Derrida on this question of mi-
crological reading and the attendant notion of 
our textured experience as a basic form of 
écriture, which for me rejoins in interesting 
ways the old medieval idea of the liber mundi 
(‘semiological ontology’) and the earlier 
Greek idea of the logos of nature as a primary 
tacit language (logos endiathetos) calling for 
a more articulate verbal language (logos pro-
phorikos). Heraclitus and the stoics were ob-
vious proponents of this notion of logos-in-
phusis which, of course, was later retrieved in 
the Christian notion of the ‘Word made flesh’ 
(see Augustine’s reworking of the Stoic logoi 
spermatikoi) and the Kabbalistic notion of the 
world as traced by the secret letters of Crea-
tion (Sefer Yetsirah). In his late work, The 
Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty of-
fers an interesting hermeneutic retrieval of the 
logos prophorikos/ endiathetos distinction 
from the point of view of what I am calling a 
carnal-diacritical phenomenology. See also 
his essays on embodied language in Signs (in 
particular ‘Indirect Language and the Voices 
of Silence’) and our discussion below of his 
notion of ‘diacritical perception’ in his 
Collège de France Course Notes of 1953. 
 
5 The name of the dog, Argos, who recognizes 
Odysseus in Bk 17 of the Odyssey is derived 
from the Greek word argos meaning gleam-
ing, shining (from which the Latin term for 
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silver, argentum, is derived). The word enar-
geis is used by Homer in Bk 16 to mark the 
‘shining’ of the Goddess Athena which trans-
forms Odysseus from a beggar-stranger back 
into himself, but unlike the dog Argos, his 
own son, Telemachus, does not at first recog-
nize his father, mistaking him instead for a 
god. It is telling, I think, that this connection 
between argos/enargeis and diacritical her-
meneutics occurs in one of the oldest texts in 
Western literature: A lesson in how to discern 
between mortal and immortal strangers 
through our carnal senses; indeed a lesson 
which, Homer suggests, dogs may well have 
to teach men! I am grateful to Richard 
Capobianco for bringing this passage from the 
Odyssey to my attention in Martin Heidegger, 
‘On the Question Concerning the Determina-
tion of the Matter for Thinking’, trans. Rich-
ard Capobianco and Marie Göbel, Epoché 
14(2) (Spring 2010) p. 213-23. 
 
6 It is telling that the first thing father and son 
do in the moment of mutual disclosure is to 
eat a meal, the two ‘strangers’ (hospes) be-
coming host (hospes) and guest (hospes) to 
each other. One finds a similar polysemy at 
work in the Greek term xenos (stranger, guest, 
enemy). A good example of diacritical her-
meneutics as hospitality (xenizein). See our 
discussion of these terminological and etymo-
logical variations of hospes, hostis and xenos 
in Anatheism: Returning to God after God 
(Columbia University Press, New York, 2010, 
pp. 27-28, 47-49). 
 
7 We could also include here Max Scheler’s 
account of embodied ethical feeling in Forms 
of Sympathy, Julia Kristeva’s psychoanalytic 
reading of semiotic unconscious experience in 
Desire in Language and later work; and Em-
manuel Levinas’ ethico-phenomenological 
analysis of pre-conceptual ‘sensibility’ in 
Otherwise than Being. See, for example, how 
Levinas describes the relation of subjectivity 
as one of ‘sensibility’ and ‘vulnerablity’ to 
pleasure and pain (Ibid., chapter 3) - a form of 
radical carnal ‘contact,’ ‘proximity,’ and ‘ex-
posure’ prior to intentionality and conscious-
ness. “The exposure to another is,” he writes, 
“proximity, obsession by the neighbor, an ob-
session despite oneself, that is, a pain” (Ibid., 
p. 55). Levinas does not deny this is already a 
form of language: but it is language in its 
most primordial expression/obsession: an eth-
ical ‘saying’ before the ‘said’ of thematization 
and representation, a language where the self 
does not give signs but is itself a sign of say-
ing (Ibid., p. 47). This is what Levinas means 
when he says that sensing is ‘saying’ (le dire) 
or pre-thematic ‘signifying’ (signifyingness or 
signifiance). I am indebted here to James Tay-
lor’s essay, ‘After the Modern Subject: Be-
tween Activity and Passivity in Heidegger, 
Levinas and Gadamer’ in Maria Luisa 
Portocarrero, Luis Umbelino, and Andrzej 
Wiercinski, ed., Hermeneutic Rationality/La 
rationalité herméneutique (Münster: LIT Ver-
lag, 2011). See also the recent phenomenolog-
ical work of Jeffrey Bloechl on Levinas’ no-
tion of sensibility as well as the recent phe-
nomenological writings of Jean-Luc Marion 
on the erotic phenomenon, Jean-Louis Chré-
tien on the mystical-poetic body and of 
Michel Henry’s phenomenology of life. 
Michel Serres’ work on the five senses, 
though not directly of the hermeneutical-
phenomenological tradition, is also of rele-
vance here. 
 
 8 For earlier sketches of a carnal hermeneu-
tics of discernment see our Strangers, Gods 
and Monsters, chapters 3-5 and 7; Anatheism, 
chapters 1-2 and 5; and ‘At the Threshold: 
Foreigners, Strangers, Others’ in Richard 
Kearney and Kascha Semonovitch, eds., Phe-
nomenologies of the Stranger: Between Hos-
tility and Hospitality (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2011, pp. 3-29). One might 
also mention here the seminal work of my 
mentor, Paul Ricoeur, and especially his 
sketch of a phenomenology of the body in 
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Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the 
Involuntary (1960). In this volume, Ricoeur 
states that human existence is torn between 
“two fundamental projects”, namely “the or-
ganic life” searching for immediate comple-
tion and “the spiritual life” of thinking aiming 
at the perfection of the whole. This ‘most 
primordial conflict’ epitomises “the dispro-
portion of βίος and λόγος”. The site of this 
conflict between βίος and λόγος, he writes, is 
‘my body’ and it is unbridgeable. The govern-
ing principle between the animal and the hu-
man is “my body” - a point that is analysed in 
three sections of Freedom and Nature, i) “In-
troduction: corporeal existence within the lim-
its of eidetics”; ii) “Body and the total field of 
motivation: the level of history and the level 
of the body” (4); and iii) “Life: Birth”. In the 
context of his subsequent work, Fallible Man 
(1960) - while perhaps still under the forma-
tive influence of both Edmund Husserl’s phe-
nomenology of Leib and of Gabriel Marcel’s 
existential notion of ‘incarnation’  - Ricoeur 
takes “my body” to be “an originating media-
tor ‘between’ myself and the world”. And, he 
claims, it is precisely this body which pro-
vides the means for both acting in the world 
and distancing myself from the natural:  
 
It opens me onto the world, either allow-
ing perceived things to appear or making 
me dependent on things I lack and of 
which I experience the need and desire 
because they are elsewhere or even no-
where in the world…In a word, my body 
opens me to the world by everything it is 
able to do.  
 
This analysis he concludes with the claim: 
“[My body] is implicated as a power in the 
instrumentality of the world, in the practicable 
aspects of this world that my action furrows 
through, in the products of work and art.” 
This shift from “my body” to the more lin-
guistic functions of work and art (poetic lan-
guage) already anticipates Ricoeur’s herme-
neutic turn in the Sixties. 
       Ricoeur’s early phenomenology of the 
body remains, however, largely a promissory 
note. After his embrace of a hermeneutics of 
signs he rarely returns to an exploration of the 
flesh, though it is tempting to see his preoc-
cupation with the relation between force and 
sens - that is between an energetics of 
drive/desire and a philosophy of interpretation 
in Freud - as a gesture in this direction (Freud 
and Philosophy, 1965). His engagement with 
Aristotle’s notion of cathartic passions in 
Volume I of Time and Narrative (1983) and 
Proust’s world of involuntary sensations and 
embodied epiphanies in volume 2 of Time and 
Narrative (1984) might well have been fur-
ther occasions to sound a carnal hermeneutics 
of taste, smell and touch (Proust’s own fa-
vored senses); but Ricoeur opts instead for an 
‘apprenticeship of signs’ which largely ig-
nores the deeper opacities of the carnal un-
conscious. And his sustained fascination with 
Spinoza’s conatus does not alas connect the 
‘desire to be’ with an incarnate bearer of this 
desire. It is desire without skin. Finally, 
though one’s hopes are revived somewhat 
when one comes to Ricoeur’s mention of our 
‘corporeal/terrestrial’ condition in Study 6 of 
Oneself as Another (1990) and his dialectic of 
embodiment and alterity in the final Study 10 
of Oneself as Another, this turns out to be 
minimalist - a five page adjudication between 
Husserl and Levinas on the Other. It is more a 
mediation between two rival positions on the 
flesh as action/passion  - too much activity in 
Husserl, too much passivity in Levinas - than 
a serious diacritical engagement with the 
enigma of enfleshment per se. (And this in-
spite of his invocation of ‘flesh’ in his sum-
mary list of imponderable Others’ in the final 
paragraph of the book). Work remains to be 
done on bringing Ricoeur’s phenomenology 
of the body/bios/eros into fertile dialogue 
with Merleau-Ponty’s radical analysis of ‘dia-
critical perception’ and la chair. (I am indebt-
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ed to Timo Helenius for several of these ref-
erences). 
     Another missed dialogue that could be 
mentioned here is that between Ricoeur and 
the feminist hermeneutics of the body running 
from Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva to Ju-
dith Butler and Elizabeth Grosz. See the time-
ly essay, ‘Understanding the Body: The Rele-
vance of Gadamer’s and Ricoeur’s View of 
the Body for Feminist Theory’, Louise 
Derksen and Annemie Halsema, in George 
Taylor and Francis Mootz, Gadamer and Ric-
oeur: Critical Horizons or Contemporary 
Hermeneutics (Continuum, New York, 2011). 
Amongst other texts, they discuss Ricoeur’s 
little known essay, ‘Wonder, Eroticism and 
Enigma’ in Cross Currents, vol. 14, 1969. 
 
9 See Claude Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthro-
pology (New York: Penguin, 1968). 
 
10 See Francis Clooney, ‘Food, the Guest, and 
the Taittiriya Upanishad: Hospitality in the 
Hindu Traditions’ in Richard Kearney and 
James Taylor, ed., Hosting the Stranger: Be-
tween Religions (New York: Continuum, 
2010), pp. 139-146. 
 
11 See chapters 1, 4 and 5 of Anatheism. 
 
12 For comparative cultural/religious exam-
ples of gustatory hospitality see also the re-
cent essays of Kalpana Seshadri, Andy Rot-
man, Joseph Lumbard, and Marianne Moyaert 
in Kearney and Taylor, ed., Hosting the 
Stranger: Between Religions. The example of 
the classic Graeco-Roman myth of Baucis and 
Philomen is also relevant here in that it tells 
how this old poor couple became hosts to 
Zeus and Hermes who first appeared as beg-
gars and only revealed themselves as gods 
when Baucis offered them her best herbs and 
Philomen his precious goose. Here is a pas-
sage from Ovid’s Metamorphoses book VIII 
which shows the central transformative role 
of ‘food’ in this primal scene of carnal hospi-
tality. Note the detailed description of the cul-
inary preparation and offering of each dish, 
comprising a good portion of Ovid’s short 
text:  
 
The old woman (Baucis), her skirts tucked 
up, her hands trembling, placed a table 
there, but a table with one of the three legs 
unequal: a piece of broken pot made them 
equal. Pushed underneath, it countered the 
slope, and she wiped the level surface 
with fresh mint. On it she put the black 
and green olives that belong to pure Mi-
nerva, and the cornelian cherries of au-
tumn, preserved in wine lees; radishes and 
endives; a lump of cheese; and lightly 
roasted eggs, untouched by the hot ashes; 
all in clay dishes. After this she set out a 
carved mixing bowl for wine, just as cost-
ly, with cups made of beech wood, hol-
lowed out, and lined with yellow bees’ 
wax. There was little delay, before the fire 
provided its hot food, and the wine, of no 
great age, circulated, and then, removed 
again, made a little room for the second 
course. There were nuts, and a mix of 
dried figs and wrinkled dates; plums, and 
sweet-smelling apples in open wicker 
baskets; and grapes gathered from the 
purple vines. In the center was a gleaming 
honeycomb. Above all, there was the ad-
ditional presence of well-meaning faces, 
and no unwillingness, or poverty of spirit. 
Meanwhile the old couple noticed that, as 
soon as the mixing bowl was empty, it re-
filled itself, unaided, and the wine ap-
peared of its own accord. They were fear-
ful at this strange and astonishing sight, 
and timidly Baucis and Philemon mur-
mured a prayer, their palms upwards, and 
begged the gods’ forgiveness for the meal, 
and their unpreparedness. They had a 
goose, the guard for their tiny cottage: as 
hosts they prepared to sacrifice it for their 
divine guests. But, quick-winged, it wore 
the old people out and, for a long time, es-
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caped them, at last appearing to take ref-
uge with the gods themselves. Then the 
heaven-born ones told them not to kill it. 
‘We are gods,’ they said. (Ovid, Meta-
morphoses, Bk VIII: “Philomen and Bau-
cis,” trans. Anthony S. Kline, University 
of Virginia, 2000) 
 
In ‘Departures: Hospitality as Mediation’, 
Kalpana Seshadri offers a hermeneutic com-
mentary on an analogous story in the Bha-
ghavata Purana (Bk 10, cantos 80-81). It re-
lates how a poor man Kuchela offers a mea-
ger bowl of puffed rice to his friend Krishna 
who gleefully eats the mere nothing and re-
turns the gift of a nothing that is the ultimate 
fullness. This emptiness in fullness recalls the 
emptying/filling wine bowl of Philomenon 
and Baucis, as well as the Buddhist notion 
that ‘emptiness’ is the highest form of fullness. 
Seshadri offers this commentary:  
 
The poor scholar (Kuchela) gathers to-
gether, in a piece of clean sari torn from 
his wife's shoulder, a heap of puffed rice, 
itself borrowed from a kindly neighbor 
emptiness itself, rice with kernels re-
moved, with nothing inside. And this he 
sets out to give to him, the friend who had 
the great capacity to receive...The friend 
sinks his palm in the heap of rice and 
opening his mouth wide eats a fistful with 
sheer delight, of the emptiness and the 
nothing, and reaches for more, and yet 
more...and as the friend empties the emp-
tiness within the puffed rice, the scholar 
feels himself filling up. His satisfaction is 
immeasurable. Incalculable happiness and 
fortune accrue to him, the more he gives 
of what he does not have, the more he 
finds himself receiving what he could not 
imagine. Can something come out of 
nothing? Is it possible to give, eat and be 
full of the nothing? Is this the meaning of 
grace? And is this also the time of hospi-
tality? ...Later Kuchela recalls that he had 
asked nothing, indeed he needs nothing... 
He is again blessed. (Kalpana Seshadri, 
“Departures: Hospitality as Mediation” in 
Richard Kearney and James Taylor, eds., 
Hosting the Stranger: Between Religions, 
p. 52).   
 
It might also be interesting to do a compara-
tive analysis of the role of the goose as a sa-
cred bird in other cultural-religious myths, for 
example, the “Paramahamsa” in both Bud-
dhist and Hindu scriptures, referring to the 
divinely enlightened sage. For Kabir, the 
Sihk-Sufi-Hindu poet, the Hamsa or Himala-
yan Goose, was considered to be a wandering 
migrant soul who bore secret messages and 
we also find the Goose-Swan playing a key 
role in the Rig Veda story of Puru Ravas and 
his wife Uruvasi. The goose that flies over 
Mount Kailash, and bathes in the lake of Ma-
nasarova (the lake of the mind, Manas) re-
mained a recurring poetic theme. The goose-
swan also plays a key role of 'transformation' 
in the popular story of Nala and Damayanti 
from the Mahabharata as well as in the Celtic 
and Greek mythologies and popular folktales 
like Grimm’s Goose Girl. I am indebted to my 
colleagues, Francis Clooney, Jyoti Sahi, Jo-
seph O’Leary and Kalpana Seshedra for this 
and related information on Buddhist and Hin-
du narratives of hospitality. 
 
13 I am indebted to Emmanuel de Saint Aubert 
for bringing these passages to my attention, 
and especially those from Merleau-Ponty’s 
Collège de France Lecture Notes of 1953, Le 
monde sensible et le monde de l’expression 
(Metispresses, Geneva, 2011). In his “Intro-
duction,” 19 f, de Saint Aubert offers a very 
illuminating commentary on the important-
ance of ‘diacritical perception’ in the later 
work of Merleau-Ponty. See also here Mer-
leau-Ponty’s essays on embodied language in 
Signs (in particular ‘Indirect Language and 
the Voices of Silence’). I would also like to 
express deep gratitude here to my close col-
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league and friend, Kascha Semonovitch, who 
first introduced me to the later Course Notes 
of Merleau-Ponty, especially those on ‘Na-
ture.’  
 
14 See our development of this play between 
prefiguration and refiguration in our Poétique 
du possible (Paris: Beauchesne, 1984) and 
The God who May Be (Bloomington, Ind.: 
Indiana University Press, 2001). See also Paul 
Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 1, chapter 3 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). 
 
15 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of 
Perception (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 246. 
One finds a moving poetic metaphor for this 
idea of sacramental sensing as transubstantia-
tion in George’s Herbert poem ‘Love bade me 
welcome’ which concludes with the very car-
nal line: “You must sit down, says Love, and 
taste my meat. So I did sit and eat.” See 
Kascha Semonovitch’s essay on this subject 
in ‘Incarnate Experience and Keeping the 
Soul Ajar’, Religion and the Arts, vol. 14, no. 
5, Special Issue: “Hospitality: Imagining the 
Stranger”, ed. Christopher Yates (2010), pp. 
515-690. See also the commentary on this po-
em as a phenomenology of the embodied 
stranger in our joint essay, ‘At the Threshold: 
Foreigners, Strangers, Others’, in Richard 
Kearney and Kascha Semonovitch, eds., Phe-
nomenologies of the Stranger: Between Hos-
tility and Hospitality (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2011), pp. 25-29.  
 
16 Merleau-Ponty, Ibid. For further elabora-
tions of a phenomenology of flesh see the re-
cent work of Didier Franck, Renaud Barabas, 
John Manoussakis, Anthony Steinbock and 
Jean-Luc Nancy (in particular Corpus and 
Noli me Tangere: On the Raising of the Body, 
both Fordham University Press, 2008-2009). 
For a more feminist hermeneutics of embod-
iment, drawing from the Continental move-
ment of thought, see the seminal writings of 
Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva; and more 
recently the work of Kelly Oliver, Karmen 
McKendrick, Virginia Burrus, Judith Butler 
and Elizabeth Grosz. There are interesting 
opportunities opening up here for dialogue 
between a hermeneutics of flesh and recent 
pioneering work on notions of embodied in-
telligence - beyond the traditional sensa-
tion/cognition divide - by thinkers like Anto-
nio Damasio, Evan Thompson, George Lakoff 
and Mark Johnson (see in particular Lakoff 
and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The 
Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western 
Thought, Basic Books, New York, 1999). 
 
17 This idea of ‘hermeneutic application’ was 
originally formulated by Hans-Georg Gada-
mer and later developed in an ethical direction 
by Paul Ricoeur and Peter Kemp (refiguration 
and attestation), in a political direction by 
Gianni Vattimo and Santiago Zabala (subver-
sion and emancipation), in a religious direc-
tion by David Tracy, Kevin Hart and Merold 
Westphal (fragmentation and community), in 
an eco-environmental direction by David 
Wood, Brian Treanor and Edward Casey 
(earth works and borders) and in a therapeutic 
direction by James Risser and Nancy Moules 
(healing, grief, and compassion). 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
